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INSTRUMENTAL COMMENSURABILITY
FREDERICK SCHAUERt
What is commensurability, and what is incommensurability? Al-
though the topic of commensurability has been discussed extensively
by philosophers, lawyers, and others for more than two decades,' the
typical discussion of commensurability is an inquiry in moral ontol-
ogy. That is, commensurability is taken to be a property inhering in
values, reasons, options, or norms, and much of the debate is about
whether that property does or does not inhere in all values, reasons,
options, or norms, or, more accurately, in all pairs or sets of values,
reasons, options, or norms. Those who argue for commensurability
maintain that all values, reasons, options, or norms2 are reducible to
some common and thus comparable metric (perhaps dollars, per-
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'Among the more noteworthy contributions to the debate are ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); INCOMMENSURABILIY, IN-
COMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinafter
INCOMMENSURABILITY]; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHYAND LITERATURE 106 (1990);JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING
ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES
(1990);James Griffin, Are There Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39 (1977);
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990); Joseph
Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1218-22 (1989);Joseph Raz & James
Griffin, Mixing Values, 65 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 83 (Supp. 1991); Donald H. Regan,
Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995,
1056-75 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779 (1994); Richard Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1995).
2 The phrase "values, reasons, options, or norms" is designed to signal my agnosti-
cism in this Article with respect to the contested question of what it is that is commen-
surable or incommensurable. Throughout the balance of this Article, I will use
shortened versions of this cumbersome phrase, but only for stylistic purposes and not
to indicate a withdrawal from my agnosticism.
" It is important to emphasize at the outset that nothing about the claim that all
values or reasons are commensurable entails the claim that the common metric is
money. See Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1421-22 (1998) (discussing different metrics). The debates about
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haps some other medium of exchange, perhaps utils, or perhaps
something else). According to this position, the value or reason hav-
ing or producing more of the property measured in the common
metric is better than the value or reason having or producing less of
that property. Relatedly, those who subscribe to the somewhat differ-
ent position known as comparability maintain that all values, reasons,
options, or norms can be compared to each other, even if they cannot
be reduced to a common metric.5 Naturally, those who argue for
incommensurability or incomparability deny the phenomenon of
commensurability or comparability, and thus maintain that the mem-
bers of some pairs or sets of reasons, values, options, or norms are
irreducibly different.
My emphasis on the word "is" in my opening question is intended
to signal a species of inquiry different from the one that provides the
focus of most of the existing commmensurability literature. I will
argue here that commensurability and comparability6 are not (or are
commodification plainly are related to the debates about commensurability. See, e.g.,
Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 295-96 (1991)
(describing commodification as "actions that... alter the sensibilities of people di-
rectly involved in market transactions by causing them to regard each other as objects
with prices rather than as persons," and explaining how technological developments
produce commodifying effects); Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity 7,
19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 71 (1990) (discussing the potential commodification of chil-
dren and women's reproductive capacities resulting from surrogacy); Margaret Jane
Radin,justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS ANDJUSTICE: NOMOS XXXI, at 165,
165-67 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) (suggesting that tradi-
tional liberal views on commodification are overinclusive in the transactions they
consider); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851
(1987) (discussing how market inalienabilities can fit within an economic framework
without being considered anomalies). For instance, a belief in universal commodifica-
tion would presuppose the validity of commensurability. More reasonably, one could
believe that all values or reasons are reducible to a common metric of utility, pleasure,
self-expression, virtue, or something else, but are not reducible to a common metric of
a medium of exchange. Nevertheless, the contingent social fact that since the early
1980s, claims of commensurability have been associated with a dollar-denominated
cost-benefit analysis is relevant to my larger claims in this Article, as existing social
understandings plainly influence the determination of what dispositions, attitudes,
rules, and decisionmaking structures would be morally best to have or to create.
' See Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 1, at 1
(explaining the difference between incommensurability and incomparability, and
developing an account of comparability).
5 Thus, it should be clear that commensurability entails comparability, but compa-
rability does not presuppose commensurability.
6 In the interests of economy of language I rarely will say "incommensurability or
incomparability," but largely will use one or the other. This is not to deny the differ-
ence between the two, see supra note 4, but only to make clear that, for my purposes
here, the distinction is of little consequence. Everything that I say in this Article about
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not only) properties of sets of values or reasons that do or do not
obtain. Rather, commensurability and comparability often have, or
can be constructed to have, the character of attitudes, dispositions,
presumptions, or conceptual frameworks, and, as such, they are best
thought of as being chosen rather than as simply existing and, fur-
thermore, as being chosen for instrumental and not intrinsic reasons.
Why this is so, and why we might want to choose one or the other of
commensurability and incommensurability, or of comparability and
incomparability, are the central questions I will address in this Article.
I
I own a white 1990 Subaru Legacy station wagon. Suppose I hap-
pen to mention this fact to a friend, who responds that she has the
same car. "No you don't," I reply. "You could not possibly have the
same car. I have seen my car almost every day for the last seven years.
And if you do not believe me when I say that the car you have is not
the same car that I have, I will show you the serial number of mine,
and that will prove conclusively that my car is not the same car as your
car."
If I were to reply in this way, perhaps my friend would assume that
I was being odd, or that I was making a weak and unsuccessful at-
tempt at humor. And she would assume one of these things because
the word "same," which in some contexts denotes identity (the person
who came to my door today was the same person who came to your
door yesterday7), in many other contexts, including this one, denotes
something else. The use of the word "same" often suggests not only
that a number of relevant similarities exist even in the face of dissimi-
larities, but also that in the instant context these dissimilarities are
immaterial. Although your car is not my car, and although we are
talking about two cars and not one car, we commonly use words of
identity-"same," "equal," "alike," "identical," "exact!'s-in a particu-
one could be said about the other, even if everything that could be said overall about
one could not necessarily be said about the other.
7 Perhaps not. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199-201 (1991) (ex-
ploring the concept of personal identity by postulating a science-fiction hypothesis in
which people are blueprinted, destroyed, and then reconstructed in another place).
8 My former father-in-law, a mathematician, thought the following joke was enor-
mously funny: A country carpenter comes to the city and takes a tour of a modern
technological laboratory at a place like M.I.T. In one of the labs, a scientist shows off
an impressive-looking apparatus, and says to the carpenter, "This is an atomic ruler,
and it can measure length to within one one-hundred thousandth of an inch." "I
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lar kind of context-dependent way. Even though we recognize that
there are, in a literal sense, differences of one kind or another, we
suppress these differences or inexactitudes, because the points of
convergence are far more important in some contexts than the points
of divergence. My example shows that there are contexts in which
you would say that your car is the same as my car even if the two were
different cars, and even if you would not trade your car for mine.
Numerous common expressions-"close enough for government
work"; "six of one and half a dozen of the other"; "it's all the same to
me"; "Tweedledum and Tweedledee'-all reflect the frequency with
which, for various strategic or instrumental reasons, we commonly
treat things that are in some respects different as if they were the
9
same.
We see the same phenomenon in the context of the ordinary dis-
course surrounding the concept of political, moral, and social equal-
ity. When the authors of the Declaration of Independence an-
nounced that "all men are created equal," they did not suppose that
even the people of whom they spoke (a subset of all people, and a
subset of all men) were in fact equal in all respects, or even in all
relevant respects. Their claim of equality was not a descriptive one,
but one that was in part aspirational, and in even larger part norma-
suppose that's good enough here in the laboratory," says the carpenter, "but in my
business we have to be exact."
9 As is often the case in these kinds of inquiries,J.L. Austin said it first, and best:
"The same" does not always mean the same. In fact it has no meaning in the
way that an "ordinary" word like "red" or "horse" has a meaning: it is a (the
typical) device for establishing and distinguishing the meanings of ordinary
words. Like "real," it is part of our apparatus in words for fixing and adjusting
the semantics ofwords.
J.L. AUSTIN, Truth, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 85, 88 n.2 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock
eds., 1961). The phrase
"[i]s of a type with which" means "is sufficiently like those standard states of
affairs with which." Thus, for a statement to be true one state of affairs must
be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also sufficiently like to
merit the same "description," which is no longer a natural relation. To say
"This is red" is not the same as to say "This is like those," nor even as to say
"This is like those which were called red." That things are similar, or even
.exactly" similar, I may literally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally
see-in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to
the conventional choice of the name to be given to the colour which they are
said to be.
Id. at 90 n.2; see alsoJ.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 41-42, 74-76 (G.J. Warnock ed.,
1962) (describing "like" as an "adjuster-word"). Austin also argued that many words,
such as "precise," "exact," and "accurate," are similarly context-, speaker-, and purpose-
dependent. See id. at 126-29, 128 (stating that "what is precise (enough) for some
purposes will be much too rough and crude for others").
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tive. As with claims of identity, likeness, exactness, and sameness,
claims of equality are not ordinarily claims of literal equality in all
respects, or even in all potentially relevant respects, but rather they
are claims that people should be treated the same in some number of
respects because they are the same in some, but clearly not in all, re-
spects.'0
The same phenomenon of attributing sameness on the basis of
partial similarity could, and often does, work in reverse as well, such
that we attribute difference even in the face of substantial similarity.
Thus, we frequently exaggerate differences in some contexts that in
other contexts would be inconsequential. The (perhaps apocry-
phal)" claim that the Inuit have a very large number of different
words for snow is a prominent example, but the same phenomenon
occurs in ordinary talk. When we say "it's not the same," we often
mean that in the face of numerous similarities, and in the face of
superficial identity, there is a difference that is particularly relevant in
some context. Just as assertions of sameness are typically context-
dependent, instrumental assertions of relevant sameness in the face
of some number of differences, so too are assertions of difference
typically context-dependent, instrumental assertions of relevant dif-
ference in the face of some number of similarities between the com-
pared particulars.
II
What emerges from this brief look at the ordinary language of
sameness and difference is the suspicion that claims of equality (and
inequality), sameness (and difference), and equivalence (or non-
equivalence) are more purposive and instrumental and less descrip-
tive than they may seem at first sight. Moreover, the purposes and
"' In some respects, therefore, attributive claims of sameness, identity, and equality
are like claims of analogy. See Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57
(1996) (casting doubt on reasoning by analogy as a discrete form of reasoning); Scott
Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argu-
ment by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 978-83 (1996) (explaining the partially distinct
nature of reasoning by analogy in terms of abductive reasoning); see a/soJOSEPH RAZ,
Law and Value in Adjudication, in THE AtJTHoRrY OF LAW 180, 201-06 (1979)
(explaining reasoning from precedent in terms of shared features of the precedent
case and the novel case). With respect to precedent and analogy, however, the com-
mon understanding of the ideas recognizes the lack of complete similarity. When we
talk of identity, sameness, likeness, or equality, however, the fact that the equivalencies
are only partial is less apparent, although, as I argue here, no less real.
" See GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE GREAT ESKIMO VOCABULARYHOAX 159-71 (1991).
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goals behind the use of such words and phrases may involve norma-
tive and prescriptive claims as well as descriptive statements. And
when claims that look descriptive on their face turn out to be pre-
scriptive and normative, a cluster of related philosophical contribu-
tions becomes relevant.
The first member of this cluster of ideas is the concept of emotive
meaning. The notion of emotive meaning, often associated with the
12
work of Charles Stevenson, suggests that the purpose of a great deal
of superficially descriptive language is to express the speaker's pro or
con attitude about what it is she is literally only describing. For in-
stance, in modern discourse, whether a speaker refers to certain em-
ployment and admissions policies as "affirmative action" or as "reverse
discrimination" tells us a great deal about her views on such policies.
Similarly, we can surmise a person's opinions on some issues of social
policy based on whether she identifies an individual as a "homeless
person" or as a "tramp."
Stevenson and his followers believe that this kind of "Boo!-
Hurrah!" connotation is a large part of ordinary talk, and, in particu-
lar, the ordinary talk that claims to be morally descriptive, as in "it is
wrong to have sex outside of marriage." For Stevenson and many
others,' 3 the best translation of "it is wrong (or right)" and other
seemingly descriptive statements is "I like it" or "I do not like it."
Related to this account is the more recent literature on "thick de-
scriptions,"'4 as most carefully developed by Philippa Foot
' s and
12 See CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 33 (1944) ("The emotive
meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history, in
emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing
or designating them."); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, FACTS AND VALUES 8 (1963)
(explaining briefly why "ethical terms, such as 'good,' 'wrong,' 'ought,' and so on, are
so habitually used to deal with disagreement in attitude"). Also useful is CARL
WELLMAN, THE LANGUAGE OF ETHICS (1961).
" Jeremy Bentham, for one, was persistently annoyed with what he called"passion-
kindling appellatives" and "impostor terms." See H.L.A. HART, The Demystification of the
Law, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 21, 27 (1982) (arguing that Bentham preferred the use of
neutral terms so as not "to cloud the issues in controversy").
" I am not referring to this term as it is used, primarily by Clifford Geertz and his
followers, in the context of anthropological investigations. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick
Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 3, 6 (1973) (explaining that "thick description" defines the intellectual
effort involved in ethnography).
'- See PHILIPPA FOOT, Moral Arguments, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96 (1978). Related discussions can be found in JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 10-20 (1990), which gives examples to support Foot
and Bernard Williams's argument that "much of our moral thinking is neither purely
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Bernard Williams.' 6 When we appear to describe some behavior as
"rude," to use one of Foot's examples,' 7 we are not just describing it.
Instead, we are either personally condemning the behavior or, at
least, describing the fact of extant societal condemnation. Whether
the condemnation comes from the speaker or from the community at
large, the important point is that the condemnation is part of the
meaning of words like "rude." To describe behavior as both rude and
praiseworthy would be to engage in an act of linguistic self-
contradiction. Many other descriptions-for example, "adorable,"
"pushy," "imposing," "bum," "hero"-are in part descriptive because
someone in agreement with the normative standards implicit in one
of these words could still disagree with the word's application to a
particular case. The words, however, are not only descriptive, be-
cause, in the process of describing, the describer is also making or
subscribing to a normative or evaluative claim, or at the very least
describing a normative or evaluative claim made by someone else or
by society at large.
The idea of thick descriptions suggests, in turn, the concept of as-
criptive language. In his earliest work, H.L.A. Hart suggested that all
of legal language is ascriptive, in that legal language characteristically
announces a legal conclusion rather than describes a hard fact about
the world.' 8 To say that a transaction is a contract, or that a defendant
is guilty, or that some form of behavior is a tort, Hart argued, is not to
identify some raw and pretheoretical fact. Instead, it is to announce a
legal outcome, and thus to ascribe to a set of facts a certain legal con-
clusion.' 9 As G.P. Baker paraphrases Hart's basic point: "[S]entences
of the form 'He did it' are primarily used to ascribe responsibility for
actions, not to describe a person's actions."20  Although Hart was
factual nor purely moral," and John McDowell, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical
Imperatives, 52 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 13, 24 (Supp. 1978), which rejects Foot's belief
"that moral requirements exert a rational influence on the will only hypothetically."
'6 See .BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 129 (1985)
(explaining that thick ethical concepts "express a union of fact and value").
17 SeeFOOT, supra note 15, at 102-05, 103 (explaining that "the meaning of 'rude' is
given by the attitude it expresses").
8 See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC'Y (n.s.) 171 (1949). Similar themes are explored in H.L.A. HART, Definition and
Theory inJurisprudence, in ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21, 23-26 (1983).
'9 SeeHart, supra note 18.
2G.P. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in LAW, MORALIY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 26, 29 (P.M.S. Hacker &J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafterLAW,
MORALITY, AND SocIETY].
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properly criticized for failing to recognize that even these ascriptive
conclusions presuppose certain descriptive antecedents-for exam-
ple, in finding a defendant guilty, the jury not only announces a legal
conclusion, but also determines that certain raw facts actually oc-
curred-the more moderate point that still emerges is that a great
deal of legal language not only describes facts, but also ascribes con-
clusions that flow from the described raw facts. Although "he did it"
purports to describe an "it" that the defendant actually did, it also
ascribes responsibility based on what is an undeniably evaluative or
normative framework.
There are, of course, important differences among these three
ideas-emotive language, thick descriptions, and ascriptive lan-
guage-but the similarities are what most interest me here. The les-
son that emerges from all three is that one need not reject the fact-
value distinction nor subscribe to the central tenets of continental
philosophy in order to recognize that descriptive sentences contain-
ing seemingly descriptive words arrayed in a seemingly descriptive
semantic structure often mask statements and conclusions that are in
important ways normative, evaluative, and prescriptive. Moreover,
language often operates to make descriptive statements serve underly-
ing normative ends, and what appear to be descriptive statements
often emerge as a consequence of creating, for instrumental reasons,
a certain kind of evaluative framework.
III
As should be evident by this time, my claim is that conclusions of
commensurability (or incommensurability) or comparability (or in-
comparability), or statements about commensurability and compara-
bility, are or can be thick or ascriptive in just this fashion. These
conclusions are more than descriptions of the terrain of value or the
landscape of reasons. They are evaluations of that terrain, or even
impositions on that terrain, and, as such, presuppose the standards,
21 See P.T. Geach, Ascfiptivism, in ETHics 22, 22 (Judith J. Thomson & Gerald
Dworkin eds., 1968) (refuting the argument of "some Oxford philosophers [who]
have resorted to denying that to call an act voluntary, intentional, and so forth, is any
sort of [causal] statement, or indeed any statement at all"); George Pitcher, Hart on
Action and Responsibility, 69 PHIL. REV. 226 (1960) (pointing out the descriptive com-
ponents of ascriptive language). Hart acknowledged the form of these criticisms in his
preface to H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968). A good subsequent
discussion describing Hart's rationales for his antireductionist stand in jurisprudence
is found in Baker, supra note 20, at 28-35.
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goals, and purposes that such an evaluation or imposition might be
thought to serve. Once we see that even claims of equality or identity
may involve instrumental selections of relevant similarities in the face
of irrelevant differences, we can see as well that a very similar claim of
comparability or commensurability may involve selecting comparable
parts from incomparable wholes, or focusing on commensurable
properties from among otherwise incommensurable pairs. To say
that a and b are commensurable may very well be to ignore certain
incommensurable properties of a and b, but that is not to make a false
statement any more than it is false to say that your car is the same as
my car. It is only to apply to conclusions about incommensurability
the same linguistic and conceptual machinery that we apply to most
other claims of sameness and identity. The question then is not
whether it is "permissible" to do so, but only whether we, as a certain
linguistic subcommunity, have in fact done so, or whether we would
want to do so.
In pursuing this line, I do not want to argue that claims of com-
mensurability or incommensurability are necessarily ascriptive. As
most of the participants in the incommensurability debates plainly
believe, and rightly so, there is a nonnormative fact of the matter,'22
and these participants appear committed to discovering what that fact
of the matter is. Although an assertion of commensurability could be
a descriptive claim, I think that I have demonstrated that it could be
an ascriptive one as well. And if this is so, then one option is not only
to understand the existing language of the commensurability debates
in thick or ascriptive terms, but also self-consciously to create or con-
struct the discourse in this way, in order, instrumentally, to serve cer-
tain normative or prescriptive functions. To put it differently,
ascriptive language and other forms of value-laden or purposive de-
scription are within a linguistic community's capabilities to create.
An important normative question, therefore, is whether a community
should create such a discourse or understanding, and this question
could be considered important even while recognizing that the onto-
The fact is a normative fact, but the identification of a normative fact is not
necessarily a normative act. Without delving too far into metaethics or moral episte-
mology, it seems clear that any objectivist metaethics, like any other observer-
independent inquiry, presupposes the ability to identify the object of morality inde-
pendent of the identifier's moral views.
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logical questions about commensurability still might and still should
be pursued.23
At this point, I want to bring into the discussion one more cluster
of ideas from the shelves of the philosophical warehouse. This is the
cluster that includes rule-utilitarianism, dispositional utilitarianism,
and all other forms of "indirect consequentalsm. The basic idea is
that we might best maximize consequences over an array of decisions
or events if we avoid attempting to maximize the consequences in
each individual case, and instead put in place a decision procedure or
rule or heuristic, or internalize or inculcate a disposition,2 which, if
followed in every case, will produce better consequences in the ag-
gregate than would be produced by attempting to maximize the con-
sequences directly in each case.
The best and first presentation of the idea I want to deploy is
John Stuart Mill's discussion of justice in chapter five of Utilitarian-
ism.6  In urging the widespread acceptance of a (nonutilitarian)
norm of justice, Mill did not believe that a norm of justice was de-
scriptively accurate, in the sense of actually mirroring what morality
actually is. Unsurprisingly, the Mill who wrote Utilitarianism can be
taken to have believed that utilitarianism provided the best account of
morality,27 and that consequently the morally best world would be
achieved, under ideal circumstances, if we simply maximized utility in
every case. But Mill also recognized that a range of factors-
In the discussion that follows, I expand on an argument for an instrumental
approach to the commensurability debate that I first suggested in Frederick Schauer,
Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 785, 786 (1994).
2' For an especially insightful overview of the philosophical terrain, see Larry
Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHIcS 315, 330 (1985). For an earlier
collection of contributions to the debates about act- and rule-utilitarianism, see
CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968). Also useful is Dan W.
Brock, Recent Work in Utilitarianism, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 241 (1973), which surveys utilitar-
ian theory from 1961 through 1971.
For a discussion of utilitarian dispositions, their uses, and their inculcation, see
Robert Merrihew Adams, Motive Utilitarianism, 73J. PHIL. 467 (1976), and Philip Pettit
& Geoffrey Brennan, Restrictive Consequentialism, 64 AUSTRALASIANJ. PHIL. 438 (1986).
26 JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL
183, 226-48 (Max Lerner ed., 1961).
1I avoid as unnecessary for my argument the question whether the John Stuart
Mill of Utilitarianism, or the John Stuart Mill of On Liberty, was "really" a utilitarian. See
David Spitz, Preface to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY at vii, vii-viii (David Spitz ed.,
1975) (noting that several scholars found Mill's writing in On Liberty inconsistent with
his other writings). The point here is only that a thoroughgoing, internally consistent,
take-no-prisoners utilitarian, which Mill may or may not have been, could, consistent
with that utilitarianism, urge the internalization and/or propagation of decidedly
nonutilitarian dispositions.
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including what we might identify now as mistake, lack of understand-
ing, lack of time, bias, conflict of interest, and weakness of the will-
might produce less overall morality in a world of widespread case-by-
case calculations of utility than would be produced if people followed
the (presumed to be) theoretical suboptimal dictates ofjustice.8
What makes Mill's approach so relevant here is not as much its
rule-based descendants as its articulation of what we now think of as
dispositional utilitarianism.30 If people were to internalize or train
themselves to certain dispositions, then those dispositions, once fol-
lowed, might be the route to the best overall consequences. Impor-
tantly, this would be so even if the dispositions would be unnecessary or
suboptimal in an ideal world So if, for example, I suspect that my own
soft-heartedness would produce a lower-than-ideal level of utility for
the decisions I have to make, I might, for good utilitarian reasons,
train myself to be especially hard-hearted or callous. Although this
strategy might produce a suboptimal level of utility if appended to the
dispositions of normal people, it likely would produce something
closer to the optimal level of utility when appended to the abnormally
soft-hearted, like myself.
IV
Now, consider all of this in the context of commensurability and
incommensurability. The question is no longer only which of these
alternatives is true, but also which of these alternatives, if widely ac-
cepted, or if accepted by a certain cadre of public decisionmakers,
would produce the best consequences, or the morally best world.
Thus, if we view commensurability and incommensurability not only
as positions that might be true or false, sound or unsound, justified or
unjustified, but also as dispositions, attitudes, or presumptions that
people might possess, then the question is whether morality would be
better served if decisionmakers had one or the other attitude, disposi-
tion, or presumption.
Moreover, a large range of problems of coordination and co-operative behavior,
of which the prisoner's dilemma is only one, may also argue against direct utilitarian-
ism. See DONALD REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 63 (1980) (concluding
that "an 'act-utilitarian prisoner's dilemma' cannot exist").
I discuss some of these descendants in FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE86-88 (1991).
30 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing dispositional utilitarian-
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Part of this inquiry turns on a series of psychological specula-
tions' about how some cohort of people will make decisions if it be-
lieves that there are, or are not, conflicts between incommensurable
values or reasons. Suppose, first, that a cohort of people believes that
there are some incommensurable values or reasons. Given this belief,
it is possible that such people, knowing that there are some incom-
mensurables, will make decisions under an implicit or de facto deci-
sion procedure that takes there to be more incommensurables than
there in fact are. Believing that there are some incommensurables, or
having been told that there are some incommensurables, decision-
32
makers might possibly see them everywhere. Over a series of cases,
therefore, some number of decisionmaking errors would be caused
by taking the options as incommensurable when in fact they are
commensurable. Moreover, when confronted with conflicting values,
some decisionmakers might take the existence of incommensurable
options, even options that are genuinely incommensurable, as a war-
rant for relying on their first, nonreflective impressions, rather than
struggling with the difficult problems that come from trying rationally
to come to a conclusion or make a decision. Although believers in
the incommensurability of values maintain that choices can be made
3' To be more precise, the inquiry turns on empirical psychological facts that are,
even if not here, capable of being determined to some level of confidence by experi-
mental or other empirical methods. In the absence of any good empirical evidence
directed to anything even close to the question at issue, I will rely here on my own
speculations.
32 There is some experimental evidence indicating that people systematically
overestimate the frequency or probability of low-probability events. See Daniel Kah-
neman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979) (stating that people would prefer paying an insurance
premium "over a small probability of a large loss"); Sarah Lichtenstein et al.,Judged
Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 551, 556-57 tbl.2 (1978)
(detailing the results of paired-comparison judgments for causes of death); David
Laibson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the Ascent of Behavioral Econom-
ics 13-15 (Dec. 11, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review) (concluding that decisionmakers make risk-seeking choices
because they overweight low-probability events and underweight high-probability
events). Sometimes this overestimation takes place with respect to low-probability
opportunities, of which winning the lottery is certainly the most obvious example.
Sometimes it takes place with respect to low-probability dangers, such as being bitten
by a poisonous snake or being killed in an airplane crash. The fact that this phe-
nomenon has been found to exist with respect to both opportunities and dangers
lends support to the notion that people, if told that there are some, but not many,
incommensurables or incomparables, will overestimate the frequency of incommen-
surables or incomparables in the aggregate, and with respect to particular cases, will
have more false positives than false negatives.
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rationally when incommensurable values or reasons conflict,s3 it is an
empirical and not a normative question whether people, when con-
fronted with what they believe to be such a conflict, will make the
decision rationally, or even carefully. Even if there are incommensur-
ables, therefore, it might be best to assume that there are not, at least
if we indulge the assumption that overestimating the number of in-
commensurables might lead people to underestimate the number of
times in which it would be fruitful to engage in difficult moral work.
It might be the case, however, that just the opposite is true. Sup-
pose decisionmakers believe that there are no incommensurables,
and that all values or reasons can be reduced to a common currency
and thus balanced, weighed, or traded off against each other. Under
such circumstances, it is possible that decisionmakers would be in-
clined to underestimate either certain values or the strength of cer-
tain reasons, perhaps as a consequence of looking for relative ease of
calculation, or perhaps as a consequence of some tendency to equili-
brate once we assume that equilibration is possible. Thus, it is possi-
ble that a belief in universal commensurability would lead people, in
some cases, to assign mistakenly low values to certain reasons or cer-
tain options, and to do so more often than they would assign mistak-
enly high values. Moreover, a belief in universal comparability might
slight certain values because of a certain psychological tendency to
want both "sides" to win at about the same rate-a tendency we might
think of as mistakenly centralizing for the sake of centralizing.34 Con-
versely, under different empirical conditions, we might think that it
would be instrumentally valuable for people to believe that there were
incommensurable values or reasons, even if there were not.
35
' See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1235, 1259
(1998) ("Incommensurability, however, does not imply the impossibility of choice, of
comparison between alternatives and selection among them.").
3 Consider the norms ofjournalism, one of which is a requirement of "balance."
If a prominent scientist gives a lecture asserting that there are no unidentified flying
objects (UFOs), the norms of journalism are such that a story is likely to appear in
which quotations from experts denying the existence of UFOs are balanced one-for-
one with quotes asserting the existence of UFOs. This one-for-one balance will deter-
mine the structure of the story even if there are almost certainly no UFOs, and thus
will impart a quite imbalanced fact of the matter. If a similar norm exists for some
cohort of decisionmakers, a consequence might be a centralizing tendency that would
undervalue, or otherwise slight, very high, but properly very high, values.
I believe that much the same can be said about the existence, or nonexistence,
of moral dilemmas, an issue that plainly involves a closely related inquiry. SeeWALTER
SINNOTr-ARMSTRONG, MORAL DILEMMAs (1988); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values,
in MoRAL LUCK 71 (1981) (discussing the conflict between moral obligations and
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A different way of expressing the same basic point is to say that we
can imagine decisionmakers possessing a disposition to commensur-
ability, or, in contrast, a disposition to incommensurability.'
6 If deci-
sionmakers possess a disposition to commensurability, they will
approach any decision with the presumption that the alternatives
could be reduced to a common metric and then weighed against each
other. In many cases, this would of course be difficult. It would in-
volve determining what the common metric is to be. It would involve
attempting to make sure that the value is appropriately assigned. It
would involve ensuring that all perverse, indirect, and secondary ef-
fects are fully taken into account. And, most of all, it would involve a
tolerance for assigning values that reflect guesses, estimates, or points
within ranges. But it would also engage decisionmakers in a process
guided by the supposition that there is always, in theory, a right an-
37
swer.
public order); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166,
166 (1973) (discussing the "nature of moral conflict"); Earl Conee, Against Moral
Dilemmas, 91 PHIL. REv. 87, 87 (1982) (stating that the possibility of moral dilemmas
"would cast a shroud of impenetrable obscurity over the concept of moral obliga-
tion"); Ruth Barcan Marcus, MoralDilemmas and Consistency, 77J. PHIL. 121, 133 (1980)
("[T]he consistency of a set of moral rules... is not incompatible with the reality of
moral dilemmas."). Several years ago I attended a lecture by Isaac Levi, and I under-
stood him to argue that it might be wise for people to believe that there were no moral
dilemmas, even if there were, because a belief in the nonexistence of moral dilemmas
would prevent people from departing prematurely from their own most difficult moral
deliberations. This idea is what inspired some of the arguments I make here. In
subsequent discussion, Levi has disclaimed making what I still believe to be an impor-
tant point, so I will appropriate it myself since Levi apparently is willing to relinquish
it.
Although I do not address them directly here, various other decisionmaking
approaches might also be thought of in terms of dispositions, attitudes, or presump-
tions. Thus, "satisficing, maximalizing, and absolutizing," Ruth Chang, Comparison and
theJustification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1580 (1998) (emphasis omitted), for
example, can be seen not only as ideal goals of decisionmaking, but as heuristics
aimed at producing the optimal array of decisions by nonideal decisionmakers operat-
ing in a nonideal world.
37 As the phrase in the text suggests, it is possible that much of what I argue here
would be applicable to understanding Ronald Dworkin's claims about "right answers"
in law. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW,
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY, supra note 20, at 58, 59 (arguing that "the occasions in which
a legal question has no right answer.., must be much rarer than is generally sup-
posed"). Even if there were not, in theory, a right answer to all (or perhaps even
most) legal questions, we might still get better judging if all judges believed that there
were. Indeed, if one understands Dworkin to be making claims about the phenome-
nology ofjudging more than about the ontology of law, Dworkin's claims about one
right answer might be understood as descriptive claims about the dispositions, pre-
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Now if universalf commensurability is false, then in at least some
of the instances in which a commensurability-inclined decisionmaker
approaches a decision, she will be inclined to impose a commensur-
ability framework upon incommensurables. Perhaps one cost of this
will be the cost of undervaluing one of the alternatives, or in some
other way slighting the considerations that the recognition of the
(stipulated) incommensurability will bring. This cost, however, may
be weighed39 against the benefit of encouraging people to pursue the
complete process of commensurating in those cases in which com-
mensurability is true, as well as against the benefit of encouraging
people to struggle with the decision as much as possible even in those
cases in which commensurability is false.
If incommensurability is true, therefore, the question is whether
adopting a universal presumption of commensurability will bring
benefits in decisionmaking care sufficient to compensate for the un-
deniable costs of imposing an erroneous decision procedure with
respect to those cases in which the values or reasons are in fact in-
commensurable. 40 And making this determination will involve de-
sumptions, attitudes, and conceptual frameworks of American judges. A separate
question then would be whether we get better judging from an array ofjudges with
"one right answer" dispositions than we would get from an array of judges with
"discretion" or "policy" dispositions. This would be an important question to ask,
regardless of which of these dispositions most accurately reflected the underlying
ontology or nature of law itself.
83 The claim of incommensurability denies that all values or reasons are commen-
surable, but, of course, does not claim that none are commensurable. Even someone
who believes that the choice between losing a finger and getting a million dollars is a
prime example of a choice between incommensurables would not deny that the
choice between getting one million dollars and getting two million dollars (or, for that
matter, between losing one finger and losing two fingers) is a choice between com-
mensurables.
39 This suggests the intriguing question of whether the costs and benefits of believ-
ing in commensurability or incommensurability are commensurable or incommensu-
rable.
" Although I have been talking about decisionmaking, much of this discussion is
also relevant to the question of how to deal with the consequences of a decision.
(This is also a decisionmaking question, albeit of a different variety.) Suppose I be-
lieve that the choice between keeping a lunch date with you and leaving suddenly to
attend to a sick relative is a choice between incommensurables, but that attending to
the sick relative is plainly the right thing to do. And then suppose I believe that this is
a choice between commensurables and, again, that attending to the sick relative is the
right thing to do. Now consider whether the believer in commensurability or the
believer in incommensurability is more likely to try later to engage in some form of
recompense (not necessarily in money, and preferably not in money), which I assume
is the right thing to do. My hunch is that the believer in commensurability is more
likely to perceive the moral residue from even the right decision, but this is psycho-
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termining what the costs and benefits would be of rejecting a pre-
sumption of commensurability (or, in a stronger version, adopting a
presumption of incommensurability) if incommensurability is true.
Such an inquiry into the costs of an ideal decision procedure in the
hands of ideal decisionmakers obviously assumes that we will be in a
nonideal world. And in this nonideal world, one possible cost is that
people who presume the truth of incommensurability may, even if the
presumption is accurate, nevertheless take that presumption as both
warranting a less thoughtful approach to hard decisions than ought
to be the case and suggesting that there are more incommensurables
than is in fact the case. Put more bluntly, the possible risk is that a
belief in incommensurability might, in the hands (or heads) of the
wrong people, produce a less thoughtful approach to decision-
making than would be produced, for those same people, by a belief in
universal commensurability and, most importantly for my claims here,
that this might be so, in the aggregate, even if the belief in incom-
mensurability is sound.
As I have suggested, the same analysis can be run in the opposite
direction, subject to one important asymmetry. The asymmetry is that
a belief in the position commonly known as incommensurability does
not commit the believer to the position that all conflicts of values,
reasons, or options involve conflicts of incommensurable values or
norms, but only to the position that there is at least one conflict be-
tween incommensurable values or norms. In contrast, however, a
belief in the position commonly known as commensurability commits
the believer to the position that all reasons or values are commensu-
rable. Consequently, the existence of one incommensurable pair
renders commensurability false, but the existence of one commensu-
rable pair does not even come close to rendering incommensurability
false.
Still, it can be useful to see how the analysis looks if there exists a
widespread disposition to incommensurability even if commensur-
ability better reflects the actual state of the relevant universe. One
scenario under which such a state of affairs might be desirable is the
scenario-quite possibly reflecting much of the concern (for people
who have a concern) about cost-benefit analysis that some people
have been expressing since the early 1980s-in which a cost-benefit
analysis places mistakenly low values on human life, the environment,
logical speculation, and I can imagine someone reaching exactly the opposite conclu-
sion. What I find harder to imagine, however, is that this is not a question that ought
to be asked in thinking about the larger questions of commensurability.
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the preservation of endangered species, future generations, and so
on. Since we are presuming the truth of commensurability as an on-
tological position, the values of life, the environment, and the preser-
vation of endangered species are, inter alia, subject to being assigned
a value on the same metric as the value of having trains run on time,
the value of having a house of a certain size, the value of having ajob
paying such-and-such a wage, the value of being, able to go to the
movies once a week, and the value of a painting by Van Gogh. But
even though commensurating all of these things is, under our as-
sumption, theoretically possible, and even though, again under our
assumption, there is a right answer to the question of what each is
worth in terms of the commensurating "currency," it is quite possible
that ordinary decisionmakers systematically will underestimate some
of the values, including perhaps the values of life and the environ-
ment.42 Under such circumstances, it might be better-that is, pro-
duce better decisions on the assumption that all values are
commensurable-if decisionmakers believed that the values of life
and the environment were incommensurable. This claim could of
course be tested, and indeed should be tested, but it hardly seems
implausible to suppose that people would place a higher imputed
value on human life when told that human life was incommensurable
with anything else than they would when told that human life could
be valued in the same currency as more efficient railway transporta-
tion.
The foregoing discussion was premised upon the assumption that
the institutional designers43 knew whether commensurability accu-
, It might also be the case that people apply an erroneous discount rate to future
generations.
" It is highly likely that the tendency to so underestimate by the people who are
actually implementing monetized cost-benefit analyses is one reason for much of the
"skepticism about the moral status of [cost-benefit analysis]." Matthew Adler, Incom-
mensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1371, 1373 (1998). Adler takes
the absence of a satisfactory defense in the literature (an empirical claim with which I
agree) as causally related to the empirical fact of widespread skepticism. See id. at
1372-73. I am more dubious. If the numbers or dollars assigned to lives and the envi-
ronment in existing cost-benefit analyses had been higher, and if the outcomes of
such analyses had rejected a substantially higher number of life-risking or environ-
ment-risking projects, I suspect that there would have been much less skepticism.
" The standpoint of the institutional designer need not presuppose the kind of
"us-them" or "archangel-prole" division that one finds in, for example, KM. HARE,
MORALTHINKING 44-64 (1981). All of us occupy different roles even vis-3.-vis ourselves,
and, in circumstances under which I am designing institutions or dispositions to con-
strain my future behavior, I exist in the role of institutional designer, even if I am
designing an institution solely for myself.
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rately represented the fact of the matter. Another possibility, of
course, as the papers in this Symposium indicate and the debates of
the last two decades signify, is that we are unsure, as between com-
mensurability and incommensurability, which is actually true. Under
these circumstances, we could and should make the foregoing analy-
sis even more complex by examining the costs of a widespread belief
in commensurability if commensurability is false, examining the costs
of a widespread belief in incommensurability if incommensurability is
false, estimating the relevant probabilities, and putting all of these
costs and probabilities through a full-scale decision-theoretic analysis
just as we would decide anything else under conditions of uncertainty.
If we were to undertake this task, we would want to take into ac-
count not only the philosophical uncertainties about whether com-
mensurability or incommensurability is the better position
philosophically, but also the philosophical uncertainties about which
decisions would be better and the empirical uncertainties about how
people would behave under various different beliefs, dispositions,
attitudes, and presumptions. This task is of course, in theory, a
daunting one, and not much less daunting in practice, where we can
substitute guesses for more extensive empirical investigations. My
message here, however, is not about the ways in which we perform the
task. Rather, it is about what we conceive the task to be. One task is
the task of determining which, as between commensurability and
incommensurability, or between comparability and incomparability, is
the wiser, sounder, better justified, or more likely true position as a
matter of philosophical first principles. Another task, however, is the
task of determining, as between commensurability and incommen-
surability, or between comparability and incomparability, which is the
belief, disposition, attitude, presumption, or whatever else that it
would be better for some cohort of decisionmakers to have.4 As the
immediately preceding paragraph suggests, it would be a mistake to
think that the question of which belief it would be better for some
group of decisionmakers to have can be answered without reference
to the answer, as best we can determine it, to the question of which
" If it is determined that some cohort of decisionmakers would be better off oper-
ating in a framework of commensurability, one possible mechanism for bringing out
this end is by excluding potentially incommensurable values or reasons from those
decisionmakers' jurisdiction. See Richard Warner, Excluding Reasons: Impossible Com-
parisons and the Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 433 (1995) (stating that legal
determinations of irrelevance can serve to exclude reasons that should not, for moral
reasons, be part of a decisional calculus).
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position is actually true. But, as most of this Article has tried to sug-
gest, and as a rich literature from John Stuart Mill through numerous
modem embellishments of consequentialism has urged,
45 it also
would be a mistake to suppose that the answer to the question of
which position is true determines conclusively the answer to the ques-
tion of which position it would be better to have. A wide range of
decisionmaking devices and heuristics, of which rules are the most
prominent, are premised on the "falsity," in some sense, of certain
decisionmaking devices. Once we recognize that dispositions are like
rules, and that dispositions might be chosen for instrumental reasons,
we can no longer think that the relevant moral inquiry, in a second-
best world, will end even if we are successful in answering the impor-
tant ontological questions about commensurability.
5 Seesources cited supra notes 24-25.
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